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Firing Regulations and Firm Size in the Developing World: 
Evidence from Differential Enforcement
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This paper examines how stringent de facto firing regulations affect firm size throughout the 
developing world. We exploit a large firm level dataset across 63 countries and within country 
variation in the enforcement of the labor codes in countries with very different de jure firing 
regulations. Our findings strongly suggest that firms facing a stricter enforcement of firing 
regulations are on average smaller. We interpret this finding as supportive of the fact that 
more stringent de facto firing regulations tend to reduce average employment. We also find 
robust evidence that this effect is stronger for more labor intensive manufacturing firms, 
especially those operating in low-technology sectors. Evidence also shows that this negative 
correlation does not hold in countries with a very weak rule of law. 
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1. Introduction 
Substantial research has been devoted to the effect of labor market regulations in several 
labor outcomes in the developing world (Heckman and Pagés, 2004). However, the effects of 
specific dimensions of labor regulations have been much less studied. Furthermore, in 
developing countries there is a big gap between the de facto and the de jure regulation, as 
enforcement is weak and evasion is large. This paper studies the effect of more stringent de facto 
firing regulations on average firm size in the developing world. In the presence of adverse 
economic conditions, strict firing regulations increase the cost of firing and may severely 
discourage firms from adjusting their workforce. Moreover, strict firing regulations also likely 
affect the firm’s hiring decisions. For example, in good times, as firms anticipate higher firing 
costs, it is plausible that firms hire fewer workers, to avoid future costs in laying them off. 
Therefore, at least theoretically, it is unclear the overall effect of higher de facto firing costs on 
average firm size.  
This paper explores a large firm level data set across 63 developing countries. It explores 
within country variation in the enforcement of firing regulations to see how these affect total 
firm size in the developing world. Firing regulations refer to advance notice and procedural 
requirements that are mandatory when workers are fired. In most countries, advance notice 
procedures impose a pre-notification period. This usually delays the termination of employment 
with a firm as third parties need to be notified and be in agreement. There is evidence that stricter 
firing likely affect the employment choices of firms in the developing world (Boeri et al., 2008).  
We explore within country variation in the de facto firing regulations faced by firms. In 
developing countries there is a large gap between the written law and its effective 
implementation. Labor markets in developing countries are usually characterized by weak   3
enforcement of the law and a large informal sector (UNDP Commission Report, 2004). For this 
reason, the same regulation in countries with very different degrees of enforcement may produce 
different effects on given firm outcomes. In this paper, we compare total firm size, measured by 
total permanent employees, for firms facing different degrees of enforcement of firing 
regulations and located in countries with different degrees of stringency of firing regulations. 
Exploring variation in enforcement in developing countries is conceptually closer to comparing 
countries with different degrees of de facto regulations (Almeida and Carneiro, 2009). 
Most of the literature studying the effects of labor regulations has not taken into account 
variation in the enforcement of the law. Some recent exceptions include Boeri and Jimeno 
(2005); Caballero et al. (2004); Almeida and Carneiro (2007, 2009); Ronconi (2010) and 
Almeida and Aterido (2011).  For example, Almeida and Carneiro (2009) look at how 
enforcement of labor regulations in Brazil constrains firm size and other firm characteristics. 
They proxy enforcement of labor regulation faced by each firm with the labor inspections at the 
city level. They show that stricter enforcement of labor regulations constrains firm size (almost 
all of this concentrated in unskilled workers) and leads to reduced use of informal labor. 
Our paper is closely related to the empirical work exploring within country variation in 
the exposure of firms to different types of firing regulations.
1 In several countries (such as Italy 
or Spain) firms that are smaller than a given threshold are not required to comply with all labor 
regulations set by the law. This exemption provides a discontinuity in the effects of regulations 
within countries. Under certain conditions, the comparison between these two groups of firms 
                                                 
1 A related strand of the literature explores within-country time series variation in labor regulations in developing 
countries (including job protection laws). Besley and Burgess (2004) and Ahsan and Pagés (2009) explore time 
variation at the state-level in India and find that stricter pro-worker labor regulation has a negative impact on state 
aggregate employment.    4
can be informative of the causal effects of the regulations on labor market outcomes. For 
example, Boeri and Jimeno (2005) and Abidoye, et al. (2009) document that workers of small 
firms are more likely to be laid-off as they are not subject to stringent employment protection. 
However, Schivardi and Torrini (2008) report higher separation rates for the workers of the 
larger firms. This is likely explained by the increased use of temporary contracts. Earlier research 
tried to quantify the impact of labor regulations in developed countries, by exploring the cross 
country and time series variation in labor regulations (e.g. Lazear, 1990, Nickel and Layard, 
1999). These studies typically relied on the cross country variation in de jure labor market 
regulation. However, identification based on the cross country time series variation in de jure 
regulation has well-known shortcomings such as omitted variables, measurement error and the 
difficulty in determining the direction of causality (Micco and Pagés, 2006; Kugler, 2007).  
  This paper investigates the link between de facto firing regulations and firm size. We 
explore a large firm-level dataset across several developing countries and compare firm size for 
firms facing different degrees of enforcement of firing regulations. We explore the Enterprise 
Surveys, collected by the World Bank. The data is particularly useful to analyze this topic. It 
collects detailed information on labor force characteristics, including alternative measures of 
firm size, as well as proxies for the enforcement of different types of regulations, including labor 
regulations. We also use the Doing Business dataset collected by the World Bank. In particular, 
we explore the difficulty of firing index which captures cross country differences in the 
stringency of firing regulations in the de jure law.
2 We also use the rigidity of employment index 
                                                 
2 The index is computed so that it is comparable across countries. In particular, they define a profile of workers and 
of firms to which the regulations refer to. The average worker is on 42 years old, a full time employee and has the 
most common pay period in the economy. Labor earnings are also equal to the economy’s average wage during the   5
and the number of procedures to start a business. The former is a general measure of the degree 
of stringency of employment related regulations. It covers the difficulty in hiring, in adjusting 
work hours as well as the difficulty in firing workers. The number of procedures to start a 
business captures the number of procedures, including necessary permits and licenses, required 
for a company to be legally in operation.  
Our prior is that firing regulations will be more binding when firms face stricter 
enforcement of the law. In other words, a stricter enforcement of firing regulations (or a more 
stringent de facto firing regulations) increases the cost to firms of adjusting labor and potentially 
will affect both hiring and firings, and ultimately firm size We follow Almeida and Aterido 
(2011) and measure enforcement of regulations with the number of days of visits done by labor 
inspections in each firm. We also use information on the total number of inspections, including 
labor, environment, fire, health, sanitation and tax inspections.
3  
Our empirical approach is close to a “differences-in-differences” model. We are 
interested in the effect of stricter de facto firing regulations (or the “treatment”) on the firms’ 
choice of workforce size. In this case, we could define “treatment” as facing a stricter 
enforcement and more rigid firing regulations in a country. Firms that face weaker enforcement 
can be considered as a “control group”. We compare firms with similar observable 
characteristics (e.g. age, ownership type, sector of activity, export status and location) within the 
same country but differing in the degree of enforcement of labor regulations that they face. In 
our reduced form model, we account for the unobserved country and sector characteristics that 
                                                                                                                                                             
entire period of his employment. This profile is therefore closer to the profile of a permanent employee with the 
firm.     
3 Almeida and Aterido (2011) explore an empirical approach similar to the one we use here to analyze the link 
between enforcement of labor market regulations and the investment in on the job training.    6
are likely to be correlated with the de facto firing regulations and firm size (e.g. the level of 
development of each sector in the country), by including country-sector fixed effects.
4 We also 
control for several firm-level characteristics correlated with firm size and the strictness of the de 
facto firing regulation. In addition we control for differences across firms in the degree of 
enforcement of the labor law that they face.  
Our findings show that firms that are subject to stricter de facto firing regulations (for 
example at the 90
th percentile of enforcement of labor market regulations) in a country with rigid 
firing regulations (e.g. Ecuador, in the 90
th percentile of the difficulty of firing index) are 15 
percent smaller than firms subject to looser enforcement in a country with less rigid regulations 
(e.g. Guatemala, in the 10
th percentile of the difficulty of firing index). This reduction in firm 
size tends to be larger for the manufacturing sector and, especially in low technology sectors 
with higher labor intensity. It is reassuring to see that our results do not hold in countries that are 
characterized by weak rule of law.  
  Our findings bear important policy implications. A stricter enforcement of firing 
regulations in countries, where these laws are stricter, constrains firm size. This will lead to a 
lower employment rate unless smaller firm size is not compensated by increased entry of firms. 
To the extent that economic growth is driven by growth of existing firms, rather than by the 
creation of new firms, the effect of strict de facto firing regulations on firm size matters for 
economic growth (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). High levels of labor regulations and extensive 
informality are associated with lower levels of economic growth (Loayza et al., 2006)  
In general, the adverse effects of different types of regulations on growth varies depend on the 
quality of the institutional environment. Taken together, the findings of this paper should not be 
                                                 
4 All our results remain  when we control for country and sector fixed effects separately.    7
interpreted as suggesting to eliminate firing regulations altogether. Furthermore, a high quality 
institutional environment is indispensable for enhancing growth and development. However, in 
the developing world, with pervasive informality, a more effective policy recommendation is to 
promote more flexible labor laws coupled with higher compliance levels. This could happen 
instead of lifting heavily the enforcement of strict firing regulations.
5 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the datasets used and presents 
summary statistics. Section 3 explains the empirical methodology. Section 4.1. reports the main 
empirical findings. Section 4.2 and 4.3 discuss several robustness checks, especially to address 
the concerns with the endogeneity of de facto firing regulations and the heterogeneity of the 
results to alternative groups of firms and countries Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We explore the Enterprise Surveys, collected by the World Bank, across 63 developing 
countries.
6 The surveys were conducted between 2002 and 2005 and the samples were designed 
to be representative of the population of firms according to their industry and location within 
each country.  
                                                 
5 Schneider (2005) estimates that the average the size of the shadow economy (as a percentage of the official GDP) 
in 2002-2003 is 38% across 96 developing countries. He highlights the role of taxation and social security 
contributions together with strict labor market regulations as contributing to the informal sector. 
6 The Enterprise Surveys are currently available for a larger set of countries. We restrict the attention to 63 countries 
due to the lack of information on the main variables of interest. This dataset has been used in many other studies 
(e.g. Svensson, 2003; Pierre and Scarpetta, 2006; Aterido et al., 2007; Almeida and Carneiro, 2009; Almeida and 
Aterido, 2011).    8
The information available in the survey has several advantages for analyzing the effects 
of firing regulations on firm size. First, it is based on a common questionnaire across a large set 
of countries, which yields comparable information on several firm-level variables. Among other 
things, the survey collects detailed information on labor market variables, like firm size and 
workforce composition and other detailed firm characteristics (e.g. firm ownership structure, age, 
exports and imports). Second, the survey collects detailed information on the enforcement of 
different pieces of regulation, including labor market regulations. In particular the survey asks 
"On average, how many days last year were spent in inspections and mandatory meetings with 
officials of each of the following agencies?” The survey then lists the tax inspectorate, labor and 
social security, fire and building safety, sanitation, municipal police and environment. Our main 
measure of enforcement of labor regulations at the firm level is captured by the number of days 
of labor inspections. We use alternative firm level variables that capture the quality of the 
enforcement of general de jure regulations in the country. These include total number of days 
spent by managers with all inspections (labor and others), the manager’s perception on the 
enforcement of property rights in the country or his/her perceptions about the consistency in the 
application of the regulations in the country. 
We explore the Doing Business country level data collected by the World Bank. This 
data includes detailed information on several regulatory features of the economies, including 
regulations of entry, labor and product markets. Of special interest to us is the information 
related to the regulations on firing compiled in the difficulty of firing index. It includes 
information on the difficulty of dismissing a redundant worker, either individually or 
collectively. These costs include the advance notifications, approvals, mandatory relocation or   9
retraining, and priority rules for re-employment.
7 Their effect is to raise the costs of dismissal of 
existing workers.  
To measure the degree of regulations in product markets, we also use the number of 
procedures required to start a business collected from the Doing Business dataset. Finally, we 
take country level GDP per capita (in 2000 dollars) from World Development Indicators and 
three governance indicators taken from Kauffman and Kraay (2003) to capture the level of 
development of the governments and corruption levels
8. 
Table A1 in the appendix defines the variables and table 1 reports the descriptive 
statistics the main variables used in the empirical analysis.  Our final sample covers 30,351 firms 
across 63 developing countries. Our main outcome of interest is total firm size, which we 
                                                 
7 The index capturing the difficulty in firing contains several components: (i) whether redundancy is disallowed as a 
basis for terminating workers; (ii) whether the employer needs to notify a third party o terminate a redundant 
worker; (iii) whether the employer needs to notify and seek approval from a third party to fire redundant workers; 
(iv) whether the employer needs approval from a third party to terminate a group of  9 redundant workers; (v) 
whether the law requires the employer to reconsider reassignment or retraining options before redundancy 
termination; (vii) whether priority rules apply for redundancies; and (vii) whether priority rules apply for 
reemployment. Higher values of the index indicate more rigid firing regulations. 
8 The governance indicators vary between -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values corresponding to better governance 
outcomes. Rule of Law is the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of the society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence; Control of Corruption is the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain including both petty 
and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture’ of the state by elites and private interests; Regulatory Quality is 
the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development. 
   10
measure with the total number of permanent workers in the firm. Appendix A2 describes the 
geographical composition of the sample. In our sample, 28.6% of the firms are located in East 
Asia and Pacific, 28.3% are in Europe and Central Asia, 17% are in Latin America and 
Caribbean, 7.8% are in Middle East and North Africa, 7.6% are in South Asia and 10.8% are in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. About 77 % of the firms in our sample operate in manufacturing while 
17.9% of operate in services sector.
9  
The average firm in the sample is 17 years old, employs 212 permanent workers and has 
a 1 out of 3 probability of being located in the country’s capital city. Approximately, 32% of the 
firms in our sample report having temporary workers, which account for 98 employees. These 
account for 29% of the total workforce. 78% of the firms are domestically owned and 8% have 
some public ownership.
10 23% of the firms in our sample are located in large cities that have 
population greater than a million. In addition, 31% of the firms in our sample report exporting 
some of their output.  
As to enforcement of labor regulations, the average firm in our sample spent 5 days last 
year in inspections and mandatory meetings with officials. This ranges from no inspections to 55 
days. The average firm in our sample reports having spent on average 10 days in inspections of 
all types with officials. In addition, firms report that on average 8% of their senior management's 
time is spent in dealing with requirements imposed by government regulations. Moreover, 6% of 
the firm managers responded positively about whether they trust the judicial system to enforce 
                                                 
9 Approximately 1.5%, 3% and 0.3% of the firms in our sample operate in agro industry, construction and other 
industries, respectively.  
10 Our final sample covers 9 sectors at the two-digit ISIC sector of activity. However, in our analyses we use an 
alternative sector variable that includes 27 categories defined over the activity of the firms. Our sector variable 
ranges widely from manufacturing of foods, garments and textiles, machinery to construction and electronics.   11
their property rights in business disputes and only 5% of them agree that government officials 
interpret the regulations consistently. 
  Figure 1 displays the average of the days of labor inspections by firm size and sector of 
activity. As expected, enforcement increases with firm size. This positive correlation holds 
across sectors since larger firms are more visible to the inspectors. Figure 2 shows that there is 
no strong correlation across the country level the rigidity in the de jure firing regulation index 
and the strictness of enforcement of labor regulations at the country level.  
3. Empirical Approach 
We examine whether the stringency of de facto firing regulations in developing countries 
affects firm size. Our prior is that a stricter de facto firing regulations increase the costs to firms 
of adjusting labor and may potentially affect both hiring and firings. The simple reduced form 
model we use relates the degree of enforcement of labor regulations faced by each firm with the 
outcomes of interest.
11 Let      denote firm size in firm j in country c i.e., logarithm of total 
employment in the firm:  
                                              
 
(1)
                                                 
11 Almeida and Aterido (2011) explore a similar approach and show that our reduced form can be derived from a 
simple model of multiple potential levels of de facto firing regulations each associated with a potential outcome. The 
model considers a profit-maximizing firm choosing the optimal size of the workforce and where the de facto 
regulation is unobserved. Letting the de facto firing regulation be a function of the de jure regulation (R) and of 
enforcement faced by the firm, (E), which is observed in our data, our reduced form can be derived. It can also be 
shown that our main coefficient of interest, showing how firm size related with de facto firing regulations, is directly 
proportional to the coefficient in the interaction term in equation (1).    12
where     is a measure of the de jure firing costs in country c,     is a measure of the enforcement 
of the labor laws in firm j in country c,      captures firm level pre-determined characteristics of 
interest of firm j located in country c and     are time invariant fixed effects capturing country 
and sector unobserved characteristics. We measure total firm size with total permanent 
employees in the firm. We measure       using the Doing Business difficulty of firing index.     is 
measured by the total days of labor inspections in the firm. In     we include a set of pre-
determined firm characteristics, including age, location of the firm, ownership characteristics 
(public or foreign capital) and export status. Our main coefficient of interest is the double 
difference term,  .  
The intuition behind our model is similar to a differences-in-differences approach. We 
want to estimate the effect of strict firing regulations (the “treatment”) on the outcome variable 
firm size. Our hypothesis is that firms that are located in countries with strict de jure firing 
regulations and subject to strict enforcement of labor regulations choose their workforce size 
systematically differently. Hence, the treatment is determined by the interaction term, being 
subject to both strict enforcement and strict de jure regulations.  
The point estimates for   can be used to quantify the percentage point difference in 
logarithm of firm size for a firm facing the 90
th percentile of the enforcement of the labor 
regulation relative to a firm facing the 10
th percentile  in the enforcement in a country with rigid 
firing regulation (e.g. in the 90
th percentile of the difficulty  of firing index) versus the same 
differential in a country with looser firing regulations (e.g. in the 10
th percentile of the difficulty 
of firing index). This difference is computed assuming that firms operate in the same sector and 
have the same set of observable characteristics (as captured by    ). Our empirical approach is 
based on the underlying assumption that the set of country-sector fixed effects,    , is constant   13
across firms, regardless of whether the firms are exposed or not to a strict enforcement of the law 
(Micco and Pagés, 2006; Almeida and Aterido, 2011, have similar assumptions).   
It is worth stressing that our empirical approach does not rely on exploring the variation 
in enforcement of the firing regulations across countries alone. The latter is likely to be 
endogenous to the firm outcomes.
 12  Instead, we explore the differential effect of enforcement in 
countries with different degrees of rigidity in the firing regulations, after controlling for country-
sector fixed effects, firm characteristics and the enforcement of labor (and also for the 
enforcement of other types of regulations). By controlling for country-sector fixed effects we are 
able to account for unobserved country-sector characteristics that are likely to be correlated with 
de facto labor regulations and with firm size (e.g. level of development of each sector in the 
country).
13 This will allow us to overcome the omitted variables problem at the country and 
sector level by exploring only within country and sector variation. By controlling for the country 
and sector fixed effects and the firm characteristics, we also hope to minimize the potential 
reverse causality problem that plagues most of the cross country work. By controlling for the 
degree of enforcement of labor regulations, we account for (unobservable) firm characteristics 
                                                 
12 A least squares regression of labor inspections on other firm characteristics shows that there is a systematic 
correlation across inspections and firm observable characteristics. In particular, firms that are older, fully-foreign 
owned, located in the capital city and managed by managers with a post-graduate degree tend to be inspected more 
frequently (results not reported but available upon request). 
13 We refrain from presenting the results only exploring variation in the firing regulations across countries because, 
in the absence of any time series variation, it would not be possible to account for country time-invariant effects. 
This raises serious concerns regarding potential country-level omitted variables. Moreover, it is likely that countries 
with larger firm sizes (and possibly lower employment creation) could demand stricter levels of protection. This 
would make it hard to determine the direction of causality when exploring only cross country variation in de jure 
regulation.   14
that could be simultaneously correlated with the enforcement and with firm size in countries with 
different degrees of rigidities in the firing regulations.  
However, our identification also presents some shortcomings. One concern could be that 
enforcement of labor regulations captures the effects of other factors or institutions also 
correlated with firm size and with firing regulations. In this case the point estimates for   may be 
biased. We will test the robustness of our findings to the inclusion of additional country variables 
correlated with the stringency of the de jure firing regulations, and interact them with the level of 
enforcement of the labor law. These will include the country’s level of economic development 
(proxied by GDP per capita), indices that represent a country’s institutional quality (rule of law, 
regulatory quality and the government control of corruption) and product market regulations 
(proxied by number of procedures to start a business in a country). Reassuringly, our main 
findings are robust to the inclusion of these control variables. 
In addition, there could still be a general concern regarding the endogeneity of the 
interaction term,          . Ideally, we would like to find an instrument that is simultaneously 
correlated with enforcement of labor regulation and is reasonably exogenous to the outcomes of 
interest. One possibility would be to follow Almeida and Carneiro (2007, 2009) and compute a 
measure of how costly it is to supply enforcement in each city.
14 Unfortunately, we do not know 
the cities where each firm is located, nor how the labor enforcement is administered across all 
the countries. In the absence of an analogous instrument, we propose a robustness check using 
alternative proxies for the enforcement of labor regulations. First, we compute the average 
                                                 
14 Almeida and Carneiro (2009) test the robustness of their findings by using an instrument to enforcement that 
captures the average distance between the city where the firm is located and all the cities within the same state 
where a subdelegacia of the Ministry of Labor is located. Distances are measured in hours of travel by car, the type 
of transportation used by labor inspectors in Brazil.    15
number of labor inspections in the same city, sector and size group where the firm operates 
(excluding the own firm). Second, we compute a variable that is smoother than the distribution 
of enforcement at the country level, by assuming only the value zero and percentiles 25, 50 and 
75 of the distribution of enforcement within each country. Both variables are positively and 
strongly correlated with the firm’s own reported labor inspections although they are arguably 
more exogenous to total firm size.  
 
 4. Main Empirical Findings 
4.1 The Effects of Enforcing Firing Regulations on Firm Size  
Table 2 reports the main findings of estimating equation (1) with least squares after 
clustering the standard errors at the country and sector level.
15 Column (1) of table 2 shows that, 
after controlling for country-sector fixed effects, firms that are exposed to a stricter de facto 
firing regulations are smaller.
16 With this coefficient we can quantify the implied 90-10 
differential in the log of firm size. The results are reported at the bottom of table 2. The implied 
coefficient in column (1) is -26 percentage points. This differential is interpreted as follows: a 
firm facing the 90
th percentile of the enforcement of firing regulations relative to a firm that is 
facing the 10
th percentile is 26 percentage points smaller in a country with rigid firing regulations 
(e.g. in Ecuador) than in a country with looser regulations (e.g. in Guatemala). This is a large 
effect since the average log firm size in our sample is 3.8.  
                                                 
15 We consider a total of 844 categories for country-sector cells.  
16 It is reassuring to see that all the results in table 2 go through if we were to control separately for country and 
sector fixed effects. The magnitudes of the effect vary between  -0.00086  in column (1) to -0.00058  in column (9) 
(Results are not reported but available upon request).   16
Columns (2) through (9) of table 2 test the robustness of this finding to alternative 
robustness checks. In column (2) we add the set of firm level pre-determined controls. Because 
we are concerned that labor inspections are used for rent extraction motives, in column (3) we 
control for the total number of inspections faced by the firm and interact total number of 
inspections with de jure firing regulations. If firms where it is easier to extract rents will have 
more inspections, this will likely happen for all inspections and controlling for the total 
inspections, would mitigate this problem. Controlling for total inspections will likely to minimize 
this concern as long as the probability of having an inspection in order to extract rents is not 
higher for the labor inspections than for other inspections.  
In column (4) we check for the possibility that the stringency of firing regulations is 
simply capturing the degree of development in the country. This is likely to be the case since it is 
well-documented in Botero et al. (2003) and Heckman and Pagés (2004) that there is a negative 
correlation between the strictness of de jure labor regulations and income levels.
 17 To address 
this we control for the interaction between enforcement of labor regulations at the firm level and 
the logarithm of GDP per capita in each country. Our coefficient of interest hardly changes. 
In columns (5) through (7) of table 2, we also test whether firing regulations are not 
capturing the effect of other country level institutions, omitted from the analysis but that could be 
likely to be correlated with these regulations. In particular, we consider differences across 
countries in the quality of several dimensions of governance and institutional quality. In 
particular, we consider country’s rule of law, regulatory quality and government control of 
                                                 
17 Reassuringly, in our sample, a simple cross country regression of the difficulty of firing index on per capita GDP, 
shows a significant and negative coefficient. This correlation is robust after to controlling for rigidity of employment 
and the country average days of labor inspections.    17
corruption. In column (8) we investigate whether our results could be capturing the impact of 
differences in entry regulations in the product market other than the effect of firing regulations.
18 
To account for this we control for the interaction between enforcement of labor regulations at the 
firm level and the number of procedures to start a business, which is a measure of how costly it is 
to establish a business in a given country. Finally, we investigate whether our findings could be 
capturing any effects of stringency of hiring regulations and the flexibility in hours. Column (9) 
controls for the rigidity of employment index, which is an average of the firing index we use and 
the difficulty of hiring and the rigidities in work hours. Reassuringly, our main results remain the 
same across all columns. In addition, the positive and significant coefficients of the interaction 
terms in columns (5) to (7) emphasize the positive impact of better quality institutions on firm 
size. Interestingly, the coefficient in column (9) is also positive and statistically strong. This 
implies that, firms facing stricter de facto hiring relations are associated with larger firm sizes. 
Hiring regulations in the doing business index relates to the extent to which fixed-term contracts 
are prohibited for permanent tasks and their maximum duration. This positive correlation likely 
captures the fact that countries that are more developed and have better institutions, have larger 
firms, but also a stricter de jure hiring regulations and better enforcement of regulations.  
 
4.2. Additional Robustness Checks 
One concern with the findings reported in our baseline specification, in column (4) of 
table 2, relates to the fact that firms in developing countries may differ in their propensity to 
bribe. This, in turn, may be correlated with the enforcement of labor regulations and ultimately 
                                                 
18 Kugler and Pica (2006) document that the impact of firing costs differ depending on the strictness of product 
market regulations.   18
with firm size. Moreover, this correlation may be different in countries with different degrees of 
stringency of firing regulations. Although the inclusion of total inspections in our reduced form 
already attempts to mitigate this concern, table 3 presents additional robustness checks. In 
column (1) we investigate whether our results are driven by firms having stricter enforcement 
eventually differing also in the management’s time spent dealing with government officials. In 
columns (2) and (3) we also check whether the enforcement could be capturing differences 
across firms in the manager’s perception on the enforcement of property rights in the country or 
his/her perceptions about the consistency in the application of the regulations in the country. 
Both variables may be correlated with the firms’ choice on total size of the workforce as well as 
with the stringency of enforcement. 
19 
Although our main results remain qualitatively the same, we get useful insights from 
these checks. Results also suggest that firms that report spending more time with officials are 
smaller in size. We also find evidence that greater perceptions are about the consistency of 
regulations and enforcement of property rights, the larger the firms are, which confirms the 
conduciveness of a favorable business environment. 
Another concern relates with the possible endogeneity of the de facto firing regulations to 
firm size. In particular, the number of labor inspections faced by each firm is likely not random 
to the firm. Even though we do not explore the variation in enforcement alone, rather the 
interaction of labor inspections and the firing regulations at the country level, one could still be 
                                                 
19 In addition, we use two additional variables. First, we use the “share of sales the firm spends on gifts or making 
informal payments to public officials to get things done”. Second, we use a binary variable that takes on the value 1 
if gifts or informal payments were expected from the firm by labor or other inspectors. Our main results remain the 
same using these variables. Results are not reported but available upon request.  
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concerned that this relation is systematically different in countries with different degrees of 
rigidity of firing regulations.
20 Columns (4) and (5) of table 3 propose two alternative measures 
of the enforcement of labor regulations. First, we proxy the enforcement faced by each firm with 
the mean labor inspections in for firms in the same size-city-sector group where the firm is 
located (after excluding the own firm).
21 Second, we proxy enforcement of labor regulations with 
a smoother variable assuming only a low, medium-low, medium-high or high enforcement level 
within each country (given by percentiles 25, 50 and 75 of the distribution of labor inspections). 
Reassuringly, our main results remain negative and statistically strong. In both specifications, 
however, the magnitude of the implied differential becomes larger than in the baseline results in 
column (4) of table 2. This suggests that our results are a lower bound to the true effects. Most 
likely enforcement of labor regulations is stricter for countries and regions with better 
institutions and where firms are larger. 
So far, we have measured firm size using the total number of permanent employees in the 
sample. Table A3 in the appendix tests the robustness of our findings to alternative measures of 
firm size. First, in column (1) we consider total firm size by including both permanent and 
temporary workers. Although the Doing Business difficulty of firing index we explore likely 
captures better the cost of permanent workers, in most countries of our sample firms can choose 
                                                 
20 The sign of the bias is also unclear. On the one hand, one could expect that more enforcement is correlated with 
larger firm size if there is more enforcement in countries with better institutional quality which in turn is associated 
with larger firms. On the other hand, more enforcement could be associated with more evasion and smaller firm size 
if there is more enforcement in places with more evasion and more crime. 
21 The variable requires enough variation within each country, city-sector-size cell. Statistics show that there is 
enough variation. The standard deviation of the mean inspections is 3.7 days (which compares with 5.2 in the days 
of labor inspections at the firm level).    20
whether to offer permanent or temporary contracts. For example, table 1 in the appendix shows 
that 32% of the firms in our sample report employing some temporary workers. These account 
on average for 29% of the total permanent workforce. A priori it is unclear whether the negative 
correlation would remain. When firing costs increase it is possible that firms substitute away 
from permanent to temporary workers so that total firm size may eventually increase. However, 
it is also possible that the reduction in the permanent employees may not be fully offset by the 
increase in temporary contracts. The results in column (1) of table A3 show that the magnitude 
of the effects is still negative but is larger in absolute value than when using only permanent 
workers.
 22  This implies that when the rigidity of the de facto firing regulations increase the total 
firm size (captured by permanent and temporary workers) is reduced further. This suggests that 
firms substitute away labor for other inputs, possibly capital. In column (2) we compute an 
alternative proxy of firm size. So far we have used the information on firm size in the year prior 
to the survey. However, the survey also collects data on the numbers of hires and fires during the 
previous year. With this information we can predict a proxy for current firm size. Finally, in 
column (3), we proxy total firm size with the logarithm of sales per employee at the firm level.
23   
Across specifications we still find a robust negative correlation between the de facto firing 
                                                 
22 To analyze this issue we have regressed total firm size, measured by the total of permanent employees, in the 
sample of firms available in column (1) in table A3. This sample is smaller as it excludes firms with missing 
information for temporary contracts. Our main coefficient of interest is -.00052 and thus is smaller than the one 
reported in column (1) of table A3. In addition, we also run our baseline specification using the number of 
temporary workers as the dependent variable. We find a negative and statistically strong coefficient. 
23 Other studies in the literature also look at the effects of labor regulations on firm’s sales (e.g. Micco and Pagés, 
2006; Almeida and Carneiro, 2007, 2009).   21
regulations and firm size. The only exception is for sales per employee whose effect is still 
negative but not statistically strong.
24   
Finally, we have also estimated equation (1) also using share of skilled workers as our 
dependent variable. We found robust evidence that stricter de facto firing regulations are 
associated with a more skilled workforce. This is in line with the results found by others that 
stringent regulations disproportionally hurt the unskilled workers (available on request).  
4.3 Heterogeneity of the Effects   
This section discusses several robustness checks for different samples. The first issue we 
discuss is whether the results are different for firms using different technologies. One might 
argue that firms differ in their need to adjust labor depending on the degree of the technological 
sophistication. Column (1) of table 4 restricts the sample only to manufacturing firms. In 
columns (2) and (3) we run the regression separately for high-tech and low-tech manufacturing 
firms.
25 Results shows that an increase in the stringency of the de facto firing regulations reduces 
firm size more in manufacturing firms than in services. In addition, the results in columns (2) and 
(3) show more pronounced effects for the low-tech manufacturing firms, which are relatively 
more dependent on labor. This follows the findings in Micco and Pagés (2006) who also find that 
low-tech firms are more affected by labor regulations. 
Another possible concern is that our findings are driven by a possible sorting of firms 
into countries and regions with looser or stricter degrees of de facto firing regulations. For 
                                                 
24  Our results in columns (1) and (2) of table A3 go through all the specifications in table 2.  Results are not 
presented  but available upon request. 
25 We follow Parisi et al. (2006) and define low-tech industries as follows: Beverages, food, garments, leather, non-
metallic and plastic materials, other manufacturing, textiles and wood and furniture.   22
example, recent empirical work has shown the importance of labor market conditions in the 
receiving country in attracting foreign firms.
26 In column (4), we therefore restrict our sample 
only to domestic firms. This is likely a group of firms that is less sensitive to changing its 
location depending on the institutional quality and on the enforcement of regulations and laws. 
Again, our main results remain showing that firms facing a stricter enforcement of firing costs 
tend to have smaller firm size. 
Finally, in many countries regulations simply do not apply to firms below a given 
threshold. In the absence of data on enforcement, some studies have explored this discontinuity 
in the application of the de jure law to identify the effects of labor regulations on different labor 
market outcomes (Boeri and Jimeno, 2005; Schivardi and Torrini, 2008; Abidoye et al., 2009). In 
our data it is also true that there is greater enforcement levels for firms of larger sizes (see Figure 
1).  To check whether our findings are affected by this variation in the enforcement, column (5) 
reports the results of our baseline specification for the set of firms only with more than 5 
workers.
27 It is reassuring to see that our results remain robust when we exclude from the sample 
this group of firms, possibly facing weaker enforcement.  
Table 5 presents additional robustness checks. First, stricter firing costs may have 
differential impacts on firm size depending on the age of the firm. In particular, it is plausible 
that older firms, having done their decision on the technology and size of the workforce while 
back, will react less to increases in the current de facto stringency of  firing regulations. In 
                                                 
26 For example, Haaland and Wooton (2003) and Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) document a positive correlation 
between labor market flexibility and foreign direct investment. Amiti and Javorcik (2008) find that lower labor costs 
in the country of destination are also associated with attracting foreign firms. 
27 In addition, we test the robustness of our findings when excluding firms with fewer than 10 or 20 employees. The 
results are not reported but are available on request.    23
contrast, younger firms which have made their decisions more recently may respond more. 
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 5 test this hypothesis. As expected, younger firms seem to be 
relatively more affected more stringent de facto firing regulations. Second, we test whether our 
results are driven by the low income economies.
28 Third, in columns (4) to (7) we test whether 
our findings are being driven by a specific region of the world by removing the countries in East 
Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean and North Africa and 
Middle East, respectively, from the sample. Reassuringly, our main findings remain and imply 
significant changes in the size of the firms throughout all columns.  
Finally, we investigate whether the results hold for countries with stronger or looser rule 
of law. Columns (8) and (9) of table 5, we divide the sample depending on the values of the rule 
of law index. The results show that increases in the de facto firing regulations affect firm size 
especially in countries with better rule of law. The coefficient is still negative, although 
insignificant, for weak rule of law countries.
29  This finding confirms the idea that regulations are 
more binding in countries with better institutional quality, in part because the quality of 
enforcement is better.  
Finally, the last set of robustness checks discusses the sensitivity of the results to 
alternative models and specifications. Table A4 in the annex check the robustness to considering 
different non-linear models. First, we consider that the effect of de jure regulation includes a 
quadratic term. Second, we explore a specification with the logarithm in the firing regulations. 
Third, we check whether the results are driven only by the countries with high de facto firing 
                                                 
28 We defined countries as low and medium income as per the World Bank’s classification in the year the data was 
collected. 
29 It is reassuring to see that the results for the good rule of law countries  go through all of the robustness checks 
reported in table 2 and in columns (1) through (4) of table 3. (Results are not reported but are available on request).   24
regulations. The latter implies that countries have de jure firing regulations that are above the 
average for the sample. Reassuringly, our main findings are stronger for firms facing high levels 
of de jure firing regulations. This suggests that even when level of firing regulations is high, if 
these are not enforced, it is unlikely that they will significantly affect firm size. Lastly, in table 
A5 in the annex, we exclude the outliers in the variable firm size and in the countries with 
extreme values for the de jure firing regulations.
30 Again, it is reassuring that our main 
correlation of interest remains negative and quantitatively important.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the impact of firing regulations on employment and the composition 
of employment at the firm level in developing countries. We explore the within-country variation 
in the enforcement of regulations in countries with different stringencies of labor law using a rich 
firm-level dataset. We find suggestive evidence that stricter firing rules  in countries where de 
jure regulations are more rigid is associated with significantly smaller firm size controlling for 
firm characteristics and country-sector fixed effects. These effects are stronger in manufacturing 
and labor intensive firms.  
Our results have important policy implications. First, strict firing regulations do constrain 
firm size in developing countries, as measured by the total number of permanent workers in the 
firm. Constraints to firm size can have negative consequences for growth if we consider that 
most of economic growth is due to growth in the existing firms as opposed to growth in the 
                                                 
30  In columns (1) and (2) we exclude the countries with the top 1% and 5% highest de jure firing regulations, 
respectively. Cameroon, Cape Verde, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Indonesia, Laos and Sri Lanka make the countries 
with the top 5% strictest firing regulations. In column (3) we exclude the extreme 5% values for (log) firm size. The 
results from excluding the top 1% and 2% firms in the (log) size distribution are available upon request.    25
creation of new firms, as documented in Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Kumar et al.  (1999). 
Second, this impact on firm size may cause lower employment if the numbers of firms in the 
economy do not rise with stricter firing costs to compensate the fall in firm size.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Main Variables 
Firm Level Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Permanent workers 30,351 211.70 1021.9 1 67,598
Log Firm Size 30,351 3.83 1.65 0 11
Temporary workers 9,804 98.25 1178.87 1 80,000
Share of temporary workers (% of total workforce) 9,804 29.01 24.61 0 100
Estimated firm size 30,287 222.51 1037.82 1 67,598
Age 29,435 17.36 16.58 0 215
Capital city (dummy) 28,854 0.29 0.45 0 1
City populated more than 1 million (dummy) 28,854 0.23 0.42 0 1
City populated between 250k and 1 million (dummy) 28,854 0.16 0.37 0 1
City populated between 50k and 250k (dummy) 28,854 0.18 0.38 0 1
City populated less than 50k (dummy) 28,854 0.14 0.35 0 1
Exporter (dummy) 29,918 0.31 0.46 0 1
Minority Foreign Ownership (dummy) 30,246 0.03 0.17 0 1
Majority Foreign Ownership (dummy) 30,246 0.05 0.21 0 1
Full Foreign Ownership (dummy) 30,246 0.06 0.24 0 1
Public Ownership (dummy) 30,151 0.08 0.27 0 1
Days of Labor Inspections in the Firm 30,351 2.33 5.25 0 55
Days of Total Inspections in the Firm 30,351 10.45 16.47 0 265
Sales per Employee 28,213 2747.69 82,892 0 11,500,000
Mgmt Time Spent Dealing with Officials (%) 26,916 8.61 13.23 0 100
Manager's Perception on Property Rights Enforced in the Country 26,430 0.59 0.49 0 1
Manager's Perception on Regulations Consistent in the Country 23,055 0.49 0.50 0 1
Country Level Variables
Difficulty in Firing  30,351 30.11 18.08 0 70
Rigidity of Employment Index  30,351 34.39 11.86 7 70
Rule of Law  30,351 -0.27 0.53 -1.31 1
Control of Corruption  30,351 -0.33 0.54 -1.15 1
Regulatory Quality  30,351 -0.11 0.62 -1.71 1
(Log) GDP per capita (WDI, in 2000 dollars)  30,351 7.28 0.94 4.85365 9
Difficulty in Firing are Rigidity of Employment taken fromthe Doing Business database.Rule ofLaw, Controlof Corruption and Regulatory Quality are from
Kaufmann et al. (2003)
Source: Author's calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys (World Bank) unless otherwise stated in parantheses.   32
Table 2: Firing Regulations and Firm Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Labor Inspections in the Firm  * Difficulty in Firing -0.00086 -0.00073 -0.00068 -0.00062 -0.00067 -0.00059 -0.00062 -0.00068 -0.00058
[0.00019]*** [0.00015]*** [0.00015]*** [0.00016]*** [0.00017]*** [0.00015]*** [0.00015]*** [0.00016]*** [0.00016]***
Total Inspections in the Firm * Difficulty in Firing - - -0.00007 -0.00007 -0.00007 -0.00007 -0.00007 -0.00006 -0.00007
[0.00006] [0.00006] [0.00006] [0.00006] [0.00006] [0.00006] [0.00006]
Labor Inspections in the Firm  0.06607 0.05040 0.02879 0.00660 0.04458 0.06889 0.05867 0.06119 -0.02133
[0.00742]*** [0.00586]*** [0.00583]*** [0.03053] [0.04367] [0.04113]* [0.04205] [0.03344]* [0.03406]
Total Inspections in the Firm  - - 0.01252 0.01255 0.01253 0.01244 0.01249 0.01245 0.00585
[0.00240]*** [0.00240]*** [0.00240]*** [0.00240]*** [0.00240]*** [0.00239]*** [0.00387]
Labor Inspections in the Firm * GDP pc - - - 0.00280 -0.00191 -0.00558 -0.00378 0.00001 0.00465
[0.00399] [0.00538] [0.00538] [0.00529] [0.00394] [0.00410]
Labor Inspections in the Firm * Rule of Law - - - - 0.00915 - - - -
[0.00814]
Labor Inspections in the Firm * Regulatory Quality - - - - - 0.01725 - - -
[0.00733]**
 Labor Inspections in the Firm * Gov. Control Corruption - - - - - - 0.01342 - -
[0.00746]*
Labor Inspections in the Firm * Procedures to Start a Business  - - - - - - - -0.00281 -
[0.00101]***
Labor Inspections in the Firm * Rigidity of Employment - - - - - - - - 0.00050
[0.00029]*
Basic Firm Level Controls Included? No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 30,351 27,387 27,387 27,387 27,387 27,387 27,387 27,387 27,387
Differential in (log) Firm Size (P90-P10) -0.26 -0.26 -0.24 -0.19 -0.24 -0.21 -0.22 -0.24 -0.21
Source: Author's calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys. 
Dependent variable is the logaritmofpermanent employees at the firmlevel. Table reports the least squares coefficients ofeq.(1)in the paper.Robust standard errors clustered at the country-sectorlevel are in brackets.* significant at
10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Basic firmlevel controls include age of the firm(and its square), export status, fully, majority and minority foreign-ownership (dummies), public ownership (dummy), and four city
dummies.Country-sectorfixed effects are included in allregressions.P90-P10differentialis reported in last row.It quantifies the impact on log firm size of increasing enforcement frompercentile 10
th to percentile 90
th in a country with
looser firing regulations (at the 10
th percentile) relative to the same change in a country with stricter firing regulations (at the 90
th percentile). All variables are defined in Table A1.   33
 








( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 ) ( 5 )
Labor Inspections in the Firm * Difficulty in Firing -0.00045 -0.00053 -0.00038 -0.00150 -0.00339
[0.00019]** [0.00015]*** [0.00016]** [0.00040]*** [0.00058]***
Total Inspections in the Firm* Difficulty in Firing -0.00022 -0.00003 -0.00015 0.00001 -0.00009
[0.00008]*** [0.00007] [0.00008]* [0.00011] [0.00006]
Labor Inspections in the Firm -0.03179 -0.02630 -0.11384 0.14995 0.10827
[0.03547] [0.02997] [0.03050]*** [0.06298]** [0.10931]
Total Inspections in the Firm 0.01860 0.01327 0.01802 0.00830 0.01279
[0.00330]*** [0.00252]*** [0.00292]*** [0.00414]** [0.00231]***
Difficulty in Firing * Management Time Spent Dealing with Officials  -0.00046 - - - -
[0.00011]***
Difficulty in Firing * Manager's Perception on Property Rights Enforced in the Country  - -0.00301 - - -
[0.00434]
Difficulty in Firing * Manager's Perception on Regulations Consistent in the Country  - - -0.00289 - -
[0.00393]
GDP pc * Labor Inspections  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Basic Firm Level Controls Included? Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 24,140 23,789 20,522 27,387 27,387
Differential in (log) Firm Size (P90-P10) -0.11 -0.16 -0.09 -0.54 -0.41
Source: Author's calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys. 
Inspections at the Firm Level
Dependent variable is the logaritm of permanent employees at the firm level. Table reports the least squares coefficients of eq. (1) in the paper. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-
sectorlevelare in brackets.* significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.Basic firmlevel controls include age of the firm(and its square),export status,fully, majority and
minority foreign-ownership (dummies), public ownership (dummy), and four city dummies. Country-sector fixed effects are included in all regressions. P90-P10differential is reported in last
row. It quantifies the impact on log firmsize of increasing enforcement from percentile 10
th to percentile 90
th in a country with looserfiring regulations (at the 10
th percentile)relative to the
same change in a country with stricterfiring regulations (at the 90
th percentile).All variables are defined in Table A1. In column (4)enforcement is proxied by average oflabor inspections in
the city-sector-size where the firmis operating, (excluding the firm's own value). In column (5)enforcement is proxied by a discrete variable taking on fourvalues depending on whetherthe
firmhas laborinspections smallerthan 25
th percentile ofthe laborinspections in the country,has laborinspections between 25
th and 50
thpercentile ofthe laborinspections in the country,has
labor inspections between 50
th and 75
th percentile of the labor inspections in the country, has labor inspections more than the 75
th percentile of the labor inspections in the country.    34
All High-Tech   Low-Tech  Domestic Firms
Firms with more 
than 5 employees
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )(5)
Labor Inspections in the Firm * Difficulty in Firing -0.00086 -0.00060 -0.00087 -0.00057 -0.00058
[0.00015]*** [0.00033]* [0.00018]*** [0.00018]*** [0.00015]***
Labor Inspections in the Firm 0.03509 -0.10577 0.07154 0.01789 0.00603
[0.03134] [0.05608]* [0.03308]** [0.03565] [0.02609]
Basic Firm Level Controls Included? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20,766 6,825 13,941 21,313 24,791
Differential in (log) Firm Size (P90-P10) -0.31 -0.36 -0.26 -0.17 -0.21
Dependent variable is the logaritm of permanent employees at the firm level. Table reports the least squares coefficients of eq. (1) in the paper. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-
sector level are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Basic firm level controls include age of the firm (and its square), export status, fully, majority and
minority foreign-ownership (dummies), public ownership (dummy), and four city dummies. Country-sector fixed effects are included in all regressions. P90-P10 differential is reported in last row.
It quantifies the impact on logfirm size of increasingenforcement from percentile 10
th to percentile90
th in a country with looser firing regulations (at the 10
th percentile) relative to the same change
in a country with stricter firing regulations (at the 90
th percentile). All variables are defined in Table A1.
Table 4:  Firing Regulations and Firm Size: Robustness to Different Subsamples




Table 5:  Firing Regulations and Firm Size: Robustness to Alternative Samples
Younger Firms Older Firms
Low Income 
Countries








(1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7)  (8)  (9) 
Labor Inspections in the Firm * Difficulty in Firing -0.00085 -0.00061 -0.00043 -0.00057 -0.00079 -0.00062 -0.00033 -0.00090 -0.00018
[0.00048]* [0.00017]*** [0.00019]** [0.00022]*** [0.00015]*** [0.00022]*** [0.00016]** [0.00021]*** [0.00021]
Labor Inspections in the Firm 0.08135 0.00306 -0.07339 -0.00822 0.06628 0.02957 -0.11120 -0.00554 0.09445
[0.07207] [0.03211] [0.05036] [0.03741] [0.02869]** [0.03305] [0.04378]** [0.04068] [0.03114]***
Basic Firm Level Controls Included? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,121 24,266 20,685 17,880 18,805 22,444 23,032 12,887 14,500
Differential in (log) Firm Size (P90-P10) -0.17 -0.22 -0.15 -0.13 -0.34 -0.15 -0.15 -0.10 -0.31
Excluding: 
Bad Rule of Law 
Countries
Good Rule of 
Law Countries
Dependent variable is the logaritmof permanent employees at the firmlevel. Table reports the least squares coefficients ofeq. (1)in the paper. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-sectorlevel are in brackets.* significant at
10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.Basic firmlevelcontrols include age ofthe firm(and its square),export status,fully,majority and minority foreign-ownership (dummies),public ownership (dummy), and four city dummies.




in a country with looser firing
regulations (at the 10
th percentile)relative to the same change in a country with stricterfiring regulations (at the 90
th percentile). Allvariables are defined in Table A1.Column (1)estimates the base modelfor firms that are younger than 5
years old and column (2)estimates the base modelforfirms that are 5ormore years old.Column (1)to (5)estimate the base modelexcluding fromthe sample low income countries in column (3), excluding the firms in East Asia and Pacific
in column (4), Europe and Central Asia in column (5), Latin America and Caribbean in column (6), and North Africa and Middle East in column (7). Column (8) and (9) estimates the base model by spliting the sample according to the
median value of the rule of law indicator taken from Kaufmann and Kraay (2003). 
Source: Author's calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys.   36
Table A1. Variables Definitions
Firm Level Variables Definition
Firm Size Total number of permanent workers. 
Age Year of the survey minus the year when the firm started operations.
Foreign-Owned : Full, Majoity, Minority
Dummy variables equal to 1 if the firm's capital is entirely owned by foreigners; less than 99% and more than 50% owned by
foreigners and less than 50%; and less than 50% and more than 10% owned by foreigners, respectively.
Exporter Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm exports directly or indirectly.
Public Ownership Dummy variable equal to 1 if the share of the firm's capital owned by the government or state is positive.
Labor Inspections in the Firm Number of visits to the firm by labor inspectors. 
Total Inspections in the Firm Number of visits to the firm by all types of inspections (including taxes, heath, safety and labor).  
Sales per worker Total sales of the firm divided by the number of its permanent workers, in 2005 dollars.
Management Time Spent Dealing with Officials Percentage of the management's time dealing with government officials.
Manager's Perception on Regulations Consistent in the 
Country
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the response of the firm manager to the question "How would you generally rate the efficiency of
government in delivering services (e.g. public utilities, public transportation, security, education and health etc.)" is "Somewhat
efficient", "Efficient" or "Very efficient".
Manager's Perception on Property Rights Enforced in 
the Country
Dummy variable equal to 1 ifthe response of the firm manager to the question "I am confident that the judicial systemwill enforce my
contractual and propertyrights inbusiness disputes."To what degree do you agree with this statement?" is "Tend to agree", "Agree in
most cases" or "Fully agree".
Manager's Perception on Regulations Consistent in the 
Country
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the response of the firm manager to the question "How would you generally rate the efficiency of
government in delivering services (e.g. public utilities, public transportation, security, education and health etc.)" is "Somewhat
efficient", "Efficient" or "Very efficient".
Country Level Variables Definition
Difficulty in Firing
Difficulty of Firing Index (DoingBusiness) :The difficultyof firingindex has 8 components:(i) whether redundancy is disallowed as a
basis for terminating workers; (ii) whether the employer needs to notify a third party (such as a government agency) to terminate 1
redundant worker; (iii) whether the employer needs to notify a third party to terminate a group of 9 redundant workers; (iv) whether
the employer needs approval from a third party to terminate 1 redundant worker; (v) whether the employer needs approval from a
third party to terminate a group of 9 redundant workers; (vi) whether the law requires the employer to reassign or retrain a worker
before making the worker redundant; (vii) whether priority rules apply for redundancies; and (viii) whether priority rules apply for
reemployment.
Rigidity of Employment
Rigidity of Employment Index (Doing Business) : The rigidity of employment index is the average of 3 subindices: a difficulty ofhiring
index, a rigidityofhours indexand a difficulty offiring index. All the subindices have several components. And alltake values between
0 and 100, with higher values indicating more rigid regulation.
Procedures to Start a Business
Number of Procedures to start a business (Doing Business): the number of all procedures that are officially required for an
entrepreneur to start up and formally operate an industrial or commercial business. 
Regulatory Quality 
Government Regulatory Quality (Kaufmann & Kraay): Regulatory Quality is the ability of the government to formulate and implement
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.
Rule of Law
Government Rule of Law (Kaufmann & Kraay): the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of the society,
and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
Gov. Control Corruption
Government Control Corruption (Kaufmann & Kraay): Control of Corruption is the extent to which public power is exercised for
private gain. Including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture’ of the state by elites and private interests.
GDP per capita   GDP per capita in 2000 dollars (World Development Indicators) 
Source: Author's calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys unless otherwise noted in parantheses.  37
 Table A2. Country/Year Composition of the Sample
Obs Freq.  Obs  Freq.
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA
Benin2004          194 0.01 Albania2005          201 0.01
BurkinaFaso2006 50 0.00 Armenia2005 333 0.01
Cameroon2006 118 0.00 Azerbaijan2005 187 0.01
CapeVerde2006 47 0.00 Belarus2005 308 0.01
Ethiopia2002 367 0.01 BiH2005 173 0.01
Kenya2003 242 0.01 Bulgaria2005 278 0.01
Lesotho2003 52 0.00 Croatia2005 166 0.01
Madagascar2005 206 0.01 Czech Rep.2005 261 0.01
Malawi2005 155 0.01 Estonia2005 139 0.00
Mali2003 132 0.00 Georgia2005 188 0.01
Mauritius2005 174 0.01 Hungary2005 515 0.02
Mozambique2002 107 0.00 Kazakhstan2005 544 0.02
Niger2006 125 0.00 Kyrgyzstan2005 200 0.01
Senegal2003 227 0.01 Latvia2005 179 0.01
SouthAfrica2003 578 0.02 Lithuania2005 185 0.01
Uganda2003 297 0.01 Moldova2005 338 0.01
Zambia2002 194 0.01 Poland2005 719 0.02
Total 3,265 Romania2005 559 0.02
Russia2005 534 0.02
EAST ASIA & PACIFIC Slovakia2005 156 0.01
Turkey2005 1641 0.05
Cambodia2003 184 0.01 Ukraine2005 553 0.02
China2003 3356 0.11 Uzbekistan2005 240 0.01
Indonesia2003 711 0.02 Total 8,597
Laos2005 244 0.01
Malaysia2002 708 0.02 LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN
Philippines2003 608 0.02 Brazil2003 1634 0.05
Thailand2004 1384 0.05 Chile2004 933 0.03
Vietnam2005 1471 0.05 CostaRica2005 343 0.01
Total 8,666 Ecuador2003 434 0.01
ElSalvador2003 465 0.02
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA Guatemala2003 435 0.01
Honduras2003 449 0.01
Egypt2006 989 0.03 Nicaragua2003 452 0.01
Lebanon2006 292 0.01
Morocco2004 827 0.03 Total 5,145
Oman2003 268 0.01






Source: Author's calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys.   38
 
 
Table A3:  Firing Regulations and Firm Size: Robustness to Alternative Proxies of Firm Size
Dependent Variable Permanent and Temporary Workers Estimated Firm Size Sales per Employee
(1) (2) (3)
Labor Inspections in the Firm * Difficulty in Firing -0.00062 -0.00061 -0.00022
[0.00022]*** [0.00016]*** [0.00025]
Labor Inspections in the Firm -0.04493 0.00769 0.07211
[0.04401] [0.03116] [0.02464]***
Basic Firm Level Controls Included? Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,666 27,329 23,210
Differential in (log) Dependent Variable (P90-P10) -0.22 -0.22 -0.08
Source: Author's calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys. 
Dependent variable is the logaritmofdifferent measures offirmsize that are stated on columns. Table reports the least squares coefficients ofeq. (1)in the paper. Robust standard errors clustered
at the country-sector level are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Basic firmlevel controls include age of the firm(and its square), export status,fully,
majority and minority foreign-ownership (dummies),public ownership (dummy),and fourcity dummies.Country-sectorfixed effects are included in allregressions.P90-P10 differentialis reported in
last row.It quantifies the impact on log firmsize ofincreasing enforcement frompercentile 10
th to percentile 90
th in a country with looserfiring regulations (at the 10
th percentile) relative to the same
change in a country with stricter firing regulations (at the 90
th percentile). All variables are defined in Table A1.   39
 
  










(1) (2) (3) (4)
Labor Inspections in the Firm* Difficulty in Firing -0.00035 -0.02558 -0.00098 -0.00076
[0.00044] [0.00870]*** [0.00045]** [0.00031]**
Labor Inspections in the Firm* (Difficulty in Firing)
2 0.00000 - - -
[0.00001]
Basic Firm Level Controls Included? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 27,387 22,148 12,025 15,362
Differential in (log) Firm Size (P90-P10) -0.23 -0.17 -0.20 -0.06
F-Test: Ho: E*R=E*R
2=0 7.71
Source: Author's calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys. 
Dependent variable is the logaritm of permanent employees at the firm level. Table reports the least squares coefficients of eq. (1) in the paper. Robust
standard errors clustered at the country-sector levelare in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Basic firmlevelcontrols
include age of the firm (and its square), export status, fully, majority and minority foreign-ownership (dummies), public ownership (dummy), and four city
dummies. Country-sector fixed effects are included in all regressions. P90-P10 differential is reported in last row. It quantifies the impact on log firm size of
increasing enforcement frompercentile 10
th to percentile 90
th in a country with looserfiring regulations (at the 10
th percentile)relative to the same change in a
country with stricter firing regulations (at the 90
th percentile). All variables are defined in Table A1.  In columns (4) and (5) the sample is divided with respect to 
the mean value of the difficulty of firing index. (The mean is  taken over country values instead of firm values.)  40
 
Table A5: Robustness Checks for Outliers
(1) (2) (3)
Excluding the top 99% 
regulated countries
Excluding the top 95% 
regulated countries
Excluding the largest and 
smallest 5% firms
Labor Inspections in the Firm* Difficulty in Firing -0.00064 -0.00052 -0.00059
[0.00016]*** [0.00019]*** [0.00014]***
Labor Inspections in the Firm 0.00768 -0.00244 0.02049
[0.03052] [0.03167] [0.02569]
Total Inspections in the Firm* Difficulty in Firing -0.00007 -0.00009 -0.00004
[0.00007] [0.00008] [0.00005]
Total Inspections in the Firm 0.01251 0.01305 0.00909
[0.00245]*** [0.00266]*** [0.00194]***
Basic Firm Level Controls Included? Yes Yes Yes
Observations 27,081 25,496 21,918
Differential in (log) Firm Size (P90-P10) -0.23 -0.10 -0.15
Source: Author's calculations based on the Enterprise Surveys. 
Dependent variable is the logaritmofpermanent employees at the firmlevel.Table reports the least squares coefficients ofeq. (1)in the paper. Robust standard errors clustered at the
country-sector level are in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Basic firmlevelcontrols include age ofthe firm(and its square), export status,
fully, majority and minority foreign-ownership (dummies), public ownership (dummy), and four city dummies. Country-sector fixed effects are included in all regressions. P90-P10
differentialis reported in last row.It quantifies the impact on log firmsize ofincreasing enforcement frompercentile 10
th to percentile 90
th in a country with looserfiring regulations (at
the 10
th percentile) relative to the same change in a country with stricter firing regulations (at the 90
th percentile). All variables are defined in Table A1. Column (1) excludes firms in
Cameroon and Georgia. Column (2) excludes firms in Cameroon, Capeverde, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Indonesia, Laos and Sri Lanka. 